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ABSTRACT: 
This study examines the short-term and medium-term market reaction to earnings 
announcements of those firms that miss analysts’ pre-tax forecasts, but meet or beat after 
tax forecasts. We are particularly interested in firms that achieve the after-tax benchmark 
through the recognition of deferred tax assets which result in a reduction in income tax 
expense. The results of the short term market reaction support the view that there is a 
premium for firms that meet after tax earnings forecasts even if they miss pre-tax 
forecasts. The results for the subsample accruals groups are less conclusive. However, 
over the twelve months following reporting our sample of firms underperformed when 
matched with a sample of firms that met or beat analysts’ forecasts both before and after 
tax. 
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1. Introduction 
This study examines the short-term and medium-term market reaction to earnings 
announcements of those firms that miss analysts’ pre-tax forecasts, but meet or beat after 
tax forecasts. We are interested in determining whether investors distinguish between 
firms on the basis of earnings quality in achieving forecast targets. Initially, we 
investigate the market reaction to all firms that miss pre-tax forecasts and meet post-tax 
forecasts but then narrow our study to those firms that achieve this after-tax benchmark 
through a specific form of earnings management - the timely recognition of tax assets. 
We narrow our focus here as the accounting choices are relatively observable at this 
point. As Dhaliwal et. al., (2004) highlight tax expense is the last account to be closed 
prior to earnings announcements and thus is the final tool available to managers to meet 
earnings forecasts. Prior research indicates that the market rewards firms that meet 
earnings forecasts and penalizes firms that miss them (Kasznik and McNichols 2002; 
Brown and Caylor 2005; Skinner and Sloan 2002).  
By identifying firms that are unable to meet pre-tax forecasts but achieve post-tax 
forecasts we are identifying firms that meet forecast levels artificially through a reduction 
in the effective tax rate.1 Income tax expense comprises a cash flow component (income 
tax payable) and an accrual component (adjustments for increases and decreases in 
deferred tax assets and liabilities). There is a body of literature that indicates that tax 
accruals are used to manage earnings and meet various earnings thresholds (for example, 
Herbohn et.al., 2009; Gordon and Joos 2004; Dhaliwal et. al., 2004; Phillips et. al., 2003; 
Nelson et. al., 2003; Gleason and Mills, 2002). Recognition of deferred tax assets reduces 
                                                 
1 By ‘artificially’, we mean that firms achieve these targets in a way other than through the generation of 
sustainable earnings from core business activities. 
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tax expense and subsequently increases earnings after tax. Other studies show that the 
effective tax rate can also be impacted by the management of pretax accruals that create 
permanent book-tax differences (for example, Dhaliwal et. al., 2002). Our focus is on the 
recognition of deferred tax assets to achieve after-tax benchmarks as this is observable in 
the Australian disclosure setting. 
To the extent that managers believe that there is an expectation that analysts 
forecasts are a benchmark or threshold that firms must meet, we would expect that where 
firms are unable to meet analysts’ forecasts, accruals will be used to manage earnings to 
try to meet the threshold (Dechow and Skinner 2000; Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 
2005). Kasznik and McNichols (2002) find that there are significant incremental rewards 
for firms that meet analysts’ forecasts consistently, whereas, firms that miss analysts’ 
forecasts experience negative returns (Kasznik and McNichols 2002). While there is 
general consensus that firms that meet EPS expectations are rewarded with a premium in 
stock price (Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn 2002), conflicting evidence regarding the value of 
resorting to earnings management to meet the benchmark has been documented. 
Athanasakou et al. (2009) assert that the market is able to detect firms that just meet 
analyst forecasts using earnings management and temporarily undervalues them until 
they are able to achieve expectations in consecutive periods. The study explores the 
reaction of the UK capital market to achieving analyst earnings expectations either 
genuinely or through earning management and find that the market provides no 
incentives for firms to achieve analysts’ forecasts through earnings management. Sloan 
(1996) on the other hand, documents that investors are not able to detect earnings 
manipulation, but ‘fixate’ on reported earnings. However, it appears that when analysts 
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release additional information on the quality of earnings, the market is able to disentangle 
the earnings management information and subsequently reassess the integrity of the 
reported earnings and a negative market reaction will follow firms that are found to have 
artificially inflated their earnings (Gavious 2007).  
The advantage of our study compared with other earnings management studies is 
that we do not rely on noisy measures of discretionary accruals, such as the Jones model, 
in order to detect earnings management but instead focus on a specific observable accrual 
– deferred tax assets. The benefit of this approach is that amounts of accruals recognized 
are observable and as such a more direct interpretation of management’s incentives can 
be made (Phillips, Pincus, and Rego 2003; Dhaliwal, Gleason, and Mills 2004; Bernard 
and Skinner 1996; Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1995).  
Australian accounting standards AAS1020 Accounting for Income Tax 
(AASB1020) and AASB112 Income Taxes (AASB112) were the relevant accounting 
regulations over the period of our study 1998 to 2008. AASB1020 was effective for the 
period 1989 to 2005 and AASB112 from 2006 on. Under AASB1020 firms were required 
to adopt the income statement method whereas under AASB112 the balance sheet 
method applied. The recognition criteria for deferred tax assets altered under the two 
accounting standards as well.  
Deferred tax assets arise from two sources: timing differences and carry-forward 
tax losses. Under AASB1020 the recognition criteria for tax assets from these two 
sources differed. For timing differences realization had to be beyond reasonable doubt 
while for carry-forward tax losses realization of the benefits had to be virtually certain. 
The implementation of AASB112 resulted in less stringent recognition criteria with tax 
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assets only having to meet the criterion of ‘probable’ utilization for both timing 
differences and carry-forward losses. 
All firms listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) with analyst consensus 
data from 1998 to 2008 are included in our sample.  From this sample we identify two 
groups of interest, our main study group - firms that missed pre-tax forecasts of earnings 
and met post-tax earnings- and our control group - firms that met or beat both pre-tax and 
post-tax forecasts. For our main sample group we measure short term returns around an 
event date – the reporting of the preliminary financial statements or the annual report 
date. We also identify two sub-samples within our main group – firms that recognize 
deferred tax assets from carry forward losses and those that recognize timing differences. 
We repeat all of our analysis on these two sub-groups. We then use our control group to 
calculate medium term returns using monthly BHARs over the twelve months prior to the 
event date and the twelve months after.  
We find that firms that miss pre-tax forecast but meet or beat after tax forecast 
earn positive cumulative abnormal returns in the short term. However, the results for the 
subsample accruals groups were less conclusive. Firms that recognized carry forward 
losses did not earn abnormal returns while firms that recognized timing differences did. 
These results did not hold however when compared with the returns of the remaining 
firms in the sample.  
Over the medium term the view appears to reverse. Our sample of firms 
underperformed the matched sample of control firms that met or beat analysts’ forecasts 
both before and after tax. It appears that firms that do not meet analysts’ pre-tax forecasts 
earn negative BHAR over a 12 month period following the reporting date. These results 
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are somewhat persistent for firms that recognize deferred tax assets from either carry 
forward losses or timing differences.  
2. Method 
To test our research question we measure short and medium term stock market 
reactions around earnings announcement dates for firms that miss pre-tax earnings 
forecasts but meet the net profit after tax forecasts. This approach allows us to assess the 
role of earnings quality in the market’s assessment of firms’ ability to meet analyst 
forecasts.  
Event Date 
For the purposes of this study, we identify the earnings announcement date as the 
date of the release of the preliminary final report for all firms except mining firms. 
Listing Rules 4.3 and 4.3A require listed firms other than mining entities to forward a 
preliminary final report to the ASX. For mining firms, the event date is the final report 
date. Preliminary annual reports are manually checked to ensure that tax notes are 
released together with the report. If tax notes are missing from the preliminary reports, 
annual report date is used as the announcement date. The date of release of the respective 
reports is designated as the event date and time zero (t = 0). All other dates are expressed 
relative to this.2 
The observations collected are divided into four categories as follows: 
1) Firms that meet analysts’ pre-tax forecasts, and meet net profit after tax forecasts 
2) Firms that do not meet analysts’ pre-tax forecasts, but meet net profit after tax 
forecasts 
                                                 
2 For example, t+1 refer to one day after the event date for the short term analysis. For the medium term 
analysis, t+1 refer to the end of the first month after the event. 
  7
3) Firms that do not meet analysts’ pre-tax forecasts, and do not meet net profit after 
tax forecasts 
4) Firms that meet analysts’ pre-tax forecasts, but do not meet net profit after tax 
forecasts 
The category of interest for this study is the second group – firms that miss pre-tax 
forecasts but meet analysts’ forecasts after tax. Observations in the first category – firms 
that meet both pre-tax and after-tax forecasts will form the control benchmark group for 
the medium term analysis. 
 
SHORT-TERM MARKET REACTION 
Initially, we measure the short term stock price impact of the release of the preliminary 
(annual) report in the days surrounding this event using cumulative abnormal returns. We 
refer to this date as the earnings announcement date. We start by measuring daily returns 
on each stock using Equation 1.  
 
                                 (1) 
Where:  
RIt  = return index on day t; and   
RIt-1  = return index on previous day. 
Daily returns are measured for the following trading windows: (-1,+1), (-2,+2), (-
3,+3), (-5,+5) and (-10,+10) days around the event date. The use of the larger range of 
days around the event date is to capture any potential investor under-reaction to news 
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announcements (Abarbanell and Lehavy 2003) and to minimize the loss of observations 
due to thin trading. 
The return index (RIt ) is the theoretical growth in value of a share holding over a 
specified period, assuming that dividends are re-invested to purchase additional units of 
an equity or unit trust at the closing price applicable on the ex-dividend date. The return 
index is calculated in Equation 2 below using data obtained from DataStream. 
                                                                                 (2) 
Where:  
RIt  = return index on day t  
RIt-1  = return index on previous day 
PIt   = price index on day t 
PIt-1   = price index on previous day 
DYt   = dividend yield percentage on day t 
N   = number of working days in a year 
Abnormal returns around the event date, ARit, are measured using the market 
adjusted returns model in Brown and Warner (1985). 
        (3) 
where:  
Rit   = daily return on each stock i on day t 
Rmt   = daily return on the All Ordinaries Accumulation Index 3 on day t 
                                                 
3 The All Ordinaries Accumulation Index is the value weighted index which assumes all dividends are 
reinvested on the ex-dividend date. 
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The abnormal return is estimated relative to the market index over the same period. The 
sample average abnormal return (AAR) of the sample firms on a particular day t is given 
by the following: 
         (4) 
where: 
ARit  = daily abnormal return on each stock i on day t relative to the benchmark 
over the same period 
Further, the average abnormal returns are summed up over various specified trading 
windows to obtain the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) across T periods (Brown and 
Warner 1985; Barber and Lyon 1997). 
                           (5) 
where: 
 T1   = beginning of the period for which the AARNt are accumulated 
 T2   = end of the period for which the AARNt are accumulated 
 MEDIUM-TERM MARKET REACTION 
We also examine the market reaction in the medium term. A prior study by Gavious 
(2007) suggests that the market does not initially respond to earnings management. 
Investors only become aware of the quality of earnings and react accordingly following 
the release of additional information from analysts once they have had time to assess the 
information provided by the firm. Examining the market reaction in the medium term is 
likely to provide a better indication as to whether the quality of earnings eventually flows 
through to the market subsequent to the release of the preliminary financial statements, 
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either through additional scrutiny by market participants or by the subsequent release of 
additional information such as the half-yearly earnings reports, and subsequently penalise 
the firm as compared to an appropriate benchmark.  
We measure the medium-term reaction using buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
(BHAR). BHARs are measured over an event window of -12 to +12 months. We are 
limited to this time period by the problems of measuring buy-and-hold returns over 
longer periods of time (Fama 1998).  An abnormal return for sample firm i over n periods 
(BHARin) is the buy-and-hold investment in sample firm i (Rit) over n periods less the 
return on a buy-and-hold investment in an asset with an appropriate expected return 
E(Rit): 
          (6) 
where: 
Rit   = monthly return on each stock i on month t 
E(Rit)   = monthly expected return on each stock i on month t 
The return on stock i (Rit) is calculated in a similar fashion to the cumulative 
abnormal returns model except but uses monthly returns (rather than daily) which are 
calculated using the monthly closing price relative returns index (RI).4 The benefit of 
using buy-and-hold abnormal returns rather than cumulative abnormal returns for longer 
holding periods is that buy-and-hold abnormal returns model includes the effect of 
compounding. 
                                                 
4 Where month (t = 0) is the event month defined by the date of the release of the annual report. For 
example, if an annual report is release on the 18th August 2005, RIit will be the closing returns index on 
stock i at 31st August 2005. 
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Control firms are employed to determine expected returns for the sample firms in 
the medium term (Barber and Lyon 1997; Cowan and Sergeant 2001). Barber and Lyon 
(1997) show that test statistics based on a control firm approach are better specified as 
compared to using a reference portfolio. This is because the use of a reference portfolio to 
calculate buy-and-hold abnormal returns is subject to new listing, rebalancing and 
skewness biases. The use of a control firm approach eliminates these problems and thus, 
is the chosen method to determine the appropriate expected return on the buy-and-hold 
model for the medium term. Further, Cowan and Sergeant (2001) find that for small 
sample sizes, the control firm method is more powerful than using a value weighted 
benchmark to calculate the appropriate expected return. 
For the purposes of our study, control firms are identified as those firms that meet 
or beat analysts’ consensus forecasts of both pre-tax profit and net profit after tax. We use 
three approaches to identify control firm benchmarks. The first benchmark, and the one 
which forms the basis for our analysis, is the amount by which the control firm beats 
forecast net profit after tax. This benchmark is chosen because prior studies show that 
firms that beat forecasts by a larger magnitude are rewarded by the market with a larger 
premium in stock prices (Koh, Matsumoto, and Rajgopal 2008; Foster, Olsen, and 
Shevlin 1984; Beaver, Clarke, and Wright 1979). This control benchmark results in the 
largest sample for testing whether the market differentiates between pre-tax and post-tax 
benchmarks. 
The second control benchmark is based on matching firms on industry and size. 
The basis for this match is that different industries experience different economic cycles 
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and thus have different returns in various periods.5 Further, firm size within an industry 
will also impact the returns a firm achieves. The third benchmark is based on size and 
market-to-book ratio(Barber and Lyon 1997).6 Both these methods of matching the 
control and sample firms result in much smaller samples and as such the BHARs 
resulting from these groupings will be used for robustness testing.  
In constructing the industry and size benchmarks, the industry classification at the 
event month of all the sample firms are identified from FinAnalysis. Following that, for 
each sample firm, a matched firm within the same Global Industry Classification 
Standard (GICS) industry group or sector is chosen in terms of the closest market 
capitalisation to that of the sample firm.  
For the size and book-to-market approach we follow Barber and Lyon (1997). All firms 
with market capitalisation between 70 and 130 per cent of the sample firms’ market 
capitalisation in the event month are identified then firms with the closest book-to-market 
ratio, measured at the fiscal year end of the event, are chosen as the control benchmark. 
This method of identifying a control firm is chosen because size and market-to-book 
explain much of the cross sectional and time series variation in stock returns (Fama and 
French 1992, 1993). Further, control firms filtered on size and then matching on the 
market-to-book ratio yields test statistics that are well specified (Barber and Lyon 1997). 
Statistical tests will be carried out to test the null hypothesis that the mean 
cumulative or buy-and-hold abnormal returns are equal to zero for the sample of firms. 
The following two parametric test statistics will be carried out for the cumulative 
                                                 
5 Size is measured by the market capitalisation of a firm 
6 Market-to-book ratio is derived by the market capitalisation divided by the book value of equity of the 
firm 
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abnormal returns and the buy-and-hold abnormal returns of the sample firms 
respectively: 
          (7) 
and 
          (8) 
where: 
  and  = sample averages of the cumulative abnormal returns and 
the buy-and-hold abnormal returns respectively. 
 and  = cross-sectional sample standard deviations of 
abnormal returns for the sample of n firms.  
To examine the impact of recognition of the various tax accruals on stock prices, 
the student t-statistic is used to test the difference in means between firms that recognise 
the various tax accruals and firms that did not within the sample. 
 
where:  
   = average CAR of the first sub-sample 
   = average CAR of the second sub-sample 
  = 0 
    =  
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This procedure is used to test if there is a difference in abnormal returns between firms 
that recognise the various deferred taxes because differing levels of discretion is allowed 
for the different tax accruals. 
Although there is a high possibility of the CARs and BHARs not being normally 
distributed, the Central Limit Theorem guarantees that if the measures of abnormal 
returns in the cross-section of firms are independent and identically distributed drawings 
from finite variance distributions, the distribution of the mean abnormal return measure 
converges to normality as the number of firms in the sample increases (Barber and Lyon 
1997). Further, the abnormal returns of the sample firms are winsorized to improve the 
quality of inference in the medium term analysis as this provides a parametric procedure 
that is better specified and often more powerful as the resulting statistic comes closer to 
the standard normal distribution (Cowan and Sergeant 2001). 
3. Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
Sample 
Data is collected over an eleven year period from 1998 to 2008 for firms listed on 
the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX). The starting point for this study is 1998 due to 
limitations in data availability prior to this year.  Financial accounting data are hand 
collected from Connect4 and Aspect FinAnalysis databases. Mean consensus analysts’ 
forecasts and actual earnings are extracted from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System 
(I/B/E/S) database using DataStream.7 Stock prices and index data are collected from 
SIRCA and cross checked with DataStream. Firm years with missing financial accounting 
data and unavailability of analysts’ forecast data from I/B/E/S are excluded from the 
                                                 
7 Actual earnings is obtained from I/B/E/S as this measure is considered superior for calculating forecast 
errors since it is more comparable to the earnings being forecasts by analysts (Beaver et al. 2008).  
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sample. Dates of the release of preliminary annual reports and final annual reports are 
hand collected from the ASX company announcements platform on the ASX website. 
Forecasts of pre-tax and post-tax profit are collected from I/B/E/S. Net profit 
before tax and net profit after tax are collected from the Aspect FinAnalysis database and 
Connect4 these values are crossed checked with data obtained from DataStream to ensure 
the integrity of the earnings figures. In addition to that, accounts of recognised deferred 
tax assets from timing differences and losses carry forward and deferred tax liabilities are 
hand collected from the financial statements and notes to the accounts.  
(Table 1 – about here) 
The initial sample consists of 2519 firms with full forecast data available. Of 
these observations firms meet both pre-tax and net profit after tax forecasts in 547 
instances. In 1602 cases firms miss both pre-tax and net profit after tax forecasts and 206 
meet the pre-tax forecast, but miss net profit after tax forecast. This leaves 164 
observations which meet the criteria to address our research - firms that miss pre-tax 
forecasts but meet after-tax consensus forecasts. Of these observations four are removed 
due to the lack of adequate stock price data or financial accounting data. The remaining 
160 firm year observations form the final sample.8 The sample selection criteria are 
presented in Table 1. Table 2 provides an industry breakdown for firms that meet the 
                                                 
8 Although this sample of 160 represents a small proportion of the available data, Cready and Hurtt (2002) 
note that many event studies use small samples Cready and Hurtt (2002) examine event studies that were 
published in the Accounting Review from 1992 through 2001. They find that of the 35 studies examined, 
16 (46%) contain at least one analysis using fewer than 50 observations. Additionally, Kothari and Warner 
(2007) suggest that if abnormal returns are concentrated in a short period, event studies that utilise very 
small samples can yield significant results Kothari and Warner (2007) state that using a sample size of 21 
allows for statistical power of 90% when abnormal returns are 1% for low returns volatility firms. For firms 
with high returns volatility, a sample size of 60 is required for statistical power of 90%. 
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selection criteria. The greatest proportion of observations represents firms from the 
material sector (26% of the sample).  
(Table 2 – about here) 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 reports the summary statistics for the full sample in Panel A, that is the 160 firm 
years in which companies missed pre-tax consensus earnings forecasts but met after-tax 
forecasts. Sub-samples of these firm years are presented in Panels B and C of this table. 
Panel B contains the descriptive statistics for those firms that increased after tax profit by 
recognition of deferred tax assets due to carry forward losses while Panel C contains the 
statistics for firms that increased after tax profits by recognizing deferred tax assets due to 
timing differences. Panel D provides the descriptive statistics for all 2519 firm 
observations for which there are consensus forecasts available. This panel provides us 
with a point for comparison. We can see by comparing Panels A and D that the sample 
firms are on average smaller relative to the population. The mean (median) total assets 
are $4945.99m ($288.44) for the sample firms compared with $5022.17m ($349.47m) for 
the population. The sample firms also have, on average, lower growth opportunities 
(based on the market to book ratio) and are less profitable than the population. 
(Table 3 – about here) 
 Of the two subsamples represented in Panels B and C, we see that firms that 
increase after tax profit by recognizing carry forward tax losses are, on average, the larger 
firms of the sample (on both total asset and market capitalization bases) but they are the 
less profitable firms (median ROA of 5.33 compared with 6.40 in Panel A) and have 
lower expected growth opportunities (median market-to-book ratio of 1.49 compared 
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with 1.82 in Panel A). Comparatively, firms that increase after tax profit by recognizing 
tax assets due to timing differences are, on average, smaller (median total assets 
=$567.96m) than the firms in Panel B but more profitable (median ROA=7.42) with 
greater growth opportunities (median market-to-book ratio = 1.83).   
4. Results 
Short term market reaction 
The first part of our analysis looks at the short term market reaction to firms that 
miss pre-tax earnings forecasts but meet post-tax earnings forecasts. Our expectation is 
that the market focuses only on after-tax earnings numbers and as such there will be a 
positive share price response around the earnings announcement date for those firms that 
meet after-tax earnings forecasts even though they missed pre-tax forecasts. Table 4 
contains the results obtained for the full sample of 160 firm year observations over the 11 
year period.  
(Table 4 – about here) 
We observe in Panel A of Table 4 a significant average abnormal return of 0.57% 
for firms that miss analysts’ pre-tax forecast but meet or beat the net profit after tax 
forecasts on the day of announcement and 1 day after the earnings announcement. Only 
the return on the first day following the announcement is significantly different from zero 
at the 10% level (p<5% using a one-tail test). This suggests that new information in the 
earnings announcement is quickly incorporated into share price.  
Panel B of Table 4 reports the CARs of various trading windows around the 
reporting date. For each of the trading windows, there are significant cumulative 
abnormal returns around the event. Within a trading window of -1 to +1 days around the 
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event, there is a cumulative abnormal return of 1.53%. This is significantly different from 
zero at the 1% level. The cumulative abnormal returns increases to 2.54% as the trading 
window is expanded to -10 to +10 trading days around the event date. This is statistically 
significant at the 5% level.  
These results suggest that the market rewards firms meet or beat the forecasts 
after tax even though pre-tax earnings are reported below forecasts. Thus providing 
support for our expectations. One interpretation of this result is that the market is 
inefficient and that firms are rewarded based upon net profit after tax without taking into 
account the operational performance of the firm before tax. On the other hand it might be 
argued that the market values the flexibility available afforded to managers through 
adjustments to tax expense (Subramanyam 1996). 
Figure 1 graphs the average abnormal return and Figure 2 the mean cumulative 
abnormal return surrounding the event date. Figure 2 clearly illustrates the build up of 
positive cumulative abnormal returns around the earnings announcement (t = 0). The 
results also confirm positive investor sentiment toward firms that are able to meet 
analysts’ forecast of net profit after tax, consistent with Hypothesis 1.  
We next observe the returns for our two subsamples groups – those firms that 
recognize deferred tax assets from carry forward losses and those that recognize deferred 
tax assets from timing differences. Table 5 contains the results for firms that recognize 
carry forward tax losses. The results in Panel A show that firms which recognise deferred 
tax assets due to carry forward losses do not yield any significant cumulative abnormal 
returns. However, in Panel B the remainder of the firms in the sample firms are rewarded 
by the market through a statistically significant positive cumulative abnormal stock return 
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on the days just before and after the event. Nevertheless, the results are inconclusive on a 
comparison difference in means which yields no significant results in Panel C. One 
explanation for this result is that the standard errors of the firms that recognise deferred 
tax assets from carry forward losses are too large to detect statistical significance. The 
small number of observations in the sub-sample may also be the cause of the observed 
insignificance. 
(Table 5 – about here) 
Table 6 contains the results for the sub-sample of 77 firms that recognize a 
deferred tax asset from timing differences. Panel A shows firms in this sub-sample have 
significant cumulative abnormal returns for all the various trading windows around the 
event date except for -10 to +10 trading days. On the other hand, the returns for the 
remaining firms in the sample, Panel B, do not appear to have significant cumulative 
abnormal stock returns around the earnings announcement date. Again, the results are 
inconclusive because tests of difference in means between the two sub-sample groups 
reported in Panel C are not significantly different from zero. Once again large standard 
errors and the small sample size of the groups may have affected the power of the test of 
difference in means. 
(Table 6 – about here) 
Medium term market response 
 
Table 7 reports the results for the BHARs of the full sample of 160 firm 
observations. BHARs are calculated using control firms matched on the percentage by 
which, firms beat earnings forecasts. These results indicate positive and statistically 
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significant buy-and-hold abnormal returns from months -4, -3 and -2 to month 0, the 
event month. These results appear to reflect positive expectations in the market about 
these firms’ earnings in the lead up to the year end result. These results do not hold when 
alternate matching bases are used. That is when the sample firm observations are matched 
on the second benchmark (industry and size), and the third benchmark (size and market-
to-book). 9  
(Table 7 – about here) 
Buy-and-hold abnormal returns for all months after the event month are reported 
in Panel B of Table 7. The results suggest that firms that miss analysts’ pre-tax forecast 
but meet analysts’ after tax forecast do not perform as well as firms that meet both pre-
tax and after tax forecasts in the medium term. From the results, the buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns reach -16.49% which is statistically significant from zero at the 1% 
level. These significantly negative buy-and-hold abnormal returns are robust to firms 
matched on industry and size, and size and book-to-market. The results support our 
second expectation which is that firms which miss analysts’ pre-tax forecast but meet or 
beat analysts’ after tax forecast would have negative stock returns in the medium term 
when matched against a firm that meet the earnings benchmarks on their earnings from 
core operations. These returns are represented graphically in Figure 3. 
(Figure 3 – about here) 
Reasons for the observed negative BHARs are not investigated in this study. 
However, a few possible explanations are identified. Firstly, analysts could have revised 
the earnings expectations downward, causing negative investor reaction (Beaver et al. 
2008; Lys and Sohn 1990). As analysts find that the firms were not able to meet the pre-
                                                 
9 As discussed in the methodology in Chapter 5 
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tax profit forecast, they may have lowered the expectations of such firms, resulting in 
negative investor sentiment. A second possible explanation would be market inefficiency. 
This is in view that investors are only able to realise that these firms are not meeting 
targets through its operations but rather, through reducing the tax expenses, and 
subsequently penalise these firms through negative stock returns subsequent months as 
more information such as analysts’ forecast or quarterly and half yearly reports are 
released into the market (Gavious 2007). A third possible reason is that these firms are 
not able to keep up with future earnings expectations in the following periods as they did 
not ‘genuinely’ meet the forecast but through the tax expense, causing negative medium 
term stock returns to be observed (Kasznik and McNichols 2002). 
The BHARs for the two sub-sample firm observations for the 12 months 
following the event date are presented in Table 8. For firms recognizing carry forward 
losses, reported in Panel A, there were only 3 months in which there was significant 
underperformance at the 10% level. The remaining firm observations underperformed 
significantly over the twelve months following reporting date (results are not reported in 
tables). It appears that firms recognize deferred tax assets due to carry forward losses to 
do not significantly underperform a matched firm that meets both pre-tax and after tax 
forecast. 
Panel B shows the buy-and-hold abnormal returns for firm years where an 
increase in deferred tax asset due to timing differences is reported. Returns for these 
firms reflect an underperformance when compared with the matched benchmark in the 3 
to 8 months after the announcement date. It should be noted that only the negative buy-
and-hold abnormal return 3 months after the announcement is significant at the 5% level. 
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Firms that did not bring to account deferred tax assets from timing differences display 
significant negative abnormal returns from 9 months after the event month.  
Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity tests were undertaken to ensure that the results still hold under controls 
matched on industry and size, and size and market-to-book (Fama and French, 1992). The 
untabulated results indicate that the negative buy-and-hold abnormal return after the 
announcement holds for the full sample even after controlling for industry and size. 
Further, the results also hold when matched against firms that meet both pre-tax and after 
tax forecasts based on size and market-to-book ratio. The results are consistent with 
significant underperformance in the months after the announcement of the earnings.  
5. Conclusion 
Our study investigates the market reaction to firms that report pre-tax earnings that miss 
analysts’ consensus pre-tax forecasts but meet or beat the analyst benchmark after-tax. 
We take the view that pre-tax earnings represent earnings from sustainable core business 
activities, whereas after tax earnings differ due to the calculation of tax payable and 
accruals resulting from tax effect accounting. We are interested in whether the market 
adjusts for firms that meet or beat earnings forecast only at the after tax level. In 
particular we are interested in the market reaction where this has in part been achieved 
through the recognition of accruals that reduce income tax expense (i.e. the recognition of 
deferred tax assets from carry forward losses and timing differences).  
The results of the short term market reaction to firms that miss pre-tax forecast 
but meet or beat after tax forecast provide support the view that there is a premium for 
firms that meet after tax earnings forecasts even if they missed the pre-tax forecast. This 
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is reflected by significant positive cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement 
dates consistent with Kasznik and McNichols (2002). The results for the subsample 
accruals groups were less conclusive. Although the market seemed to value these 
earnings in the short term, over the medium term this sample of firms did not perform as 
well as a matched sample of firms that met or beat analysts’ forecasts both before and 
after tax. It appears that firms that do not meet analysts’ pre-tax forecasts earn negative 
BHAR over a 12 month period following the reporting date. These results are somewhat 
persistent for firms that recognize deferred tax assets from either carry forward losses or 
timing differences.  
One interpretation of our findings is that the market inefficiently values firms that 
only meet or beat after tax earnings forecasts in the short term but corrects this in the 
medium term. An alternate explanation is that the market values managements’ flexibility 
in being able to achieve these benchmarks. However, the sustainability of these earnings 
is the key issue and it appears that over the medium term this is doubted by investors. 
Another observation that can be made from our findings is that it appears that investors 
have an expectation of good performance by these firms in the months leading up to 
reporting date. This may put pressure on management to meet the after tax earnings 
number in the belief that after-tax earnings are the focus of investors.  
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Table 1 
Sample Selection Criteria 
The sample selection process involves excluding firm year observations that have missing mean consensus 
analyst forecasts and insufficient financial and stock price data. The final sample consists of 160 firm year 
observations from the period of 1998 to 2008. 
Selection Criteria 
Observations excluded based on 
selection criteria 
Observations remaining after 
selection criteria 
Initial sample – observations with 
analyst forecast data  2519 
Exclude observations that meet pre-tax 
and NPAT1 forecasts 547 1972 
Exclude observations that miss pre-tax 
and NPAT forecasts 1602 370 
Exclude observations that meet pre-tax 
but miss NPAT forecast 206 164 
Exclude observations with insufficient 
financial or stock price data 4 160 
1NPAT is the net profit after tax 
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Table 2 
Distribution of sample firm year observations by Global Industry Classification 
Standard (GICS) Code 
GICS Sector Number Percentage of sample 
Consumer Discretionary 25 15.63% 
Consumer Staples 5 3.13% 
Energy 11 6.88% 
Financials 12 7.50% 
Health Care 24 15.00% 
Industrials 21 13.13% 
Information Technology 12 7.50% 
Materials 42 26.25% 
Telecommunication Services 6 3.75% 
Utilities 2 1.25% 
Total 160 100.00% 
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Table 3 
Summary Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for sample firms for the period 1998 to 2008. The table shows the accounting variables calculated at balance date in the relevant year where the 
firm misses the mean consensus analyst forecast but meet/beat the net profit after tax forecast. The mean, median, standard deviation, maximum and minimum values 
are shown. Market-to-book ratio is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. ROA is the return on assets calculated as EBITDA divided by total 
assets. 
 Panel A: Full sample N Total Assets ($m) Market Capitalisation ($m) Market-to-Book ratio Return on Assets (%) 
All sample firm year observations 160     
Mean  4945.99 3455.58 2.61 5.06 
Median  288.44 255.59 1.82 6.40 
Standard deviation  33489.92 13408.28 3.68 18.34 
Maximum  418058.00 129544.60 20.23 128.02 
Minimum   3.94 4.95 -16.19 -76.84 
Panel B: Sample with increase in deferred tax assets due to carry forward losses 
Firms with increase in DTA due to carry forward losses 38     
Mean  14834.47 7730.19 2.34 5.03 
Median  947.94 659.31 1.49 5.33 
Standard deviation  67674.91 23950.93 3.07 5.71 
Maximum  418058.00 129544.60 14.76 20.03 
Minimum   14.35 19.00 0.26 -8.04 
Panel C: Sample with increase in deferred tax assets due to timing differences 
Firms with increase in DTA due to timing differences 77     
Mean  2948.17 4203.08 2.60 8.68 
Median  567.96 355.10 1.83 7.42 
Standard deviation  6339.73 16468.34 3.81 9.43 
Maximum  37126.00 129544.60 15.30 48.78 
Minimum   8.82 28.62 -16.19 -8.04 
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Panel D: All observations 
All observations 2519     
Mean  5022.17 2567.60 3.66 6.04 
Median  349.47 382.26 1.91 7.13 
Standard deviation  31673.64 8456.25 25.32 17.00 
Maximum  603160.10 130282.90 954.51 130.29 
Minimum   0.08 2.45 -51.83 -173.70 
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Table 4 
Short term market reaction 
Panel A shows the average abnormal returns (AARs) and the t-statistic of 160 sample firms that miss analysts' 
earnings before tax forecasts but meet the after tax forecasts for -10 to +10 trading days surrounding the issue of the 
annual reports. Panel B shows the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and the t-statistics for various event windows 
surrounding the issuance of the annual reports. The AARs and CARs and generated using a standard market adjusted 
event study methodology for the period 1998 to 2008. The release of the annual report is at trading day 0. The 
symbols *,** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 1 Day 0 is the event 
date, which is the release of the preliminary or final annual report to the market.  
Panel A: Average Abnormal Returns for tradings days -10 to +10 
Trading days1 N AAR t-value p-value 
-10 142 0.31% 0.94 0.3482 
-9 147 0.18% 0.61 0.5399 
-8 135 -0.08% -0.37 0.7090 
-7 136 -0.19% -0.71 0.4800 
-6 138 -0.28% -1.00 0.3206 
-5 132 -0.02% -0.08 0.9378 
-4 135 0.06% 0.19 0.8473 
-3 131 0.11% 0.47 0.6422 
-2 132 0.30% 0.91 0.3648 
-1 137 0.39% 1.41 0.1608 
0 139 0.57% 1.62 0.1070 
+1 134 0.57% 1.81* 0.0715 
+2 140 -0.24% -0.72 0.4716 
+3 138 0.01% 0.04 0.9643 
+4 140 0.36% 0.90 0.3694 
+5 138 0.27% 0.97 0.3353 
+6 135 0.24% 0.68 0.4948 
+7 131 -0.11% -0.45 0.6538 
+8 135 -0.14% -0.44 0.6579 
+9 135 -0.06% -0.25 0.8058 
+10 139 0.21% 0.71 0.4795 
Panel B: Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Window   Mean CAR t-value p-value 
-1,+1 trading day 153 1.53% 2.73*** 0.0071 
-2,+2 trading days 157 1.59% 2.37** 0.0191 
-3,+3 trading days 158 1.71% 2.08** 0.0389 
-4,+4 trading days 158 2.13% 2.38** 0.0187 
-5,+5 trading days 159 2.37% 2.51** 0.0132 
-10,+10 trading days 159 2.45% 2.11** 0.0368 
AARs and CARs for 160 sample firms are calculated relative to the value weighted market index on the ASX all 
ordinaries. The AAR and CAR for firm i is calculated by: 
 
ARit is the difference between Rit and E(Rit) while Rit is the daily return on firm i and E(Rit) is the expected return for 
firm i using the return on the All Ordinaries Index. 
  31
Table 5 
Short term market reaction for firms that recognize deferred tax assets from losses 
CARs for sample firms are calculated relative to the value weighted market index on the ASX all ordinaries. The AAR and 
CAR for firm i is calculated by:  
 
ARit is the difference between Rit and E(Rit) while Rit is the daily return on firm i and E(Rit) is the expected return for firm i 
using the return on the All Ordinaries Index. 
The CARs are generated using a standard market adjusted event study methodology for the period 1998 to 2008. The 
release of the annual report is at trading day 0. The symbols *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns of 38 observations with an increase in DTA due to carry forward losses 
Window Mean CAR t-value p-value 
-1,+1 trading day 0.41% 0.59 0.5604 
-2,+2 trading days 0.19% 0.23 0.8176 
-3,+3 trading days 1.82% 1.25 0.2188 
-4,+4 trading days 1.15% 0.75 0.4561 
-5,+5 trading days 1.75% 1.09 0.2815 
-10,+10 trading days 2.74% 1.13 0.2658 
Panel B: Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns of 122 observations with no increase or decrease in DTA due to carry 
forward losses 
Window Mean CAR t-value p-value 
-1,+1 trading day 1.88% 2.68*** 0.0084 
-2,+2 trading days 2.02% 2.41*** 0.0175 
-3,+3 trading days 1.68% 1.71* 0.0896 
-4,+4 trading days 2.43% 2.26** 0.0255 
-5,+5 trading days 2.56% 2.25** 0.0261 
-10,+10 trading days 2.36% 1.77* 0.0789 
Panel C: Difference in mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns between observations with increase in DTA due to carry 
forward losses and observations with no change or decrease in DTA due to carry forward losses 
Window Difference in Mean CAR t-value p-value 
-1,+1 trading day -1.47% -1.49 0.1401 
-2,+2 trading days -1.84% -1.57 0.1198 
-3,+3 trading days 0.14% 0.07 0.9442 
-4,+4 trading days -1.28% -0.61 0.5439 
-5,+5 trading days -0.81% -0.36 0.7161 
-10,+10 trading days 0.38% 0.14 0.8907 
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Table 6 
Short term market reaction for firms that recognize deferred tax assets from timing 
differences 
CARs for sample firms are calculated relative to the value weighted market index on the ASX all ordinaries. The AAR and 
CAR for firm i is calculated by:  
 
ARit is the difference between Rit and E(Rit) while Rit is the daily return on firm i and E(Rit) is the expected return for firm i 
using the return on the All Ordinaries Index. 
The CARs are generated using a standard market adjusted event study methodology for the period 1998 to 2008. The release of 
the annual report is at trading day 0. The symbols *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns of 77 observations with an increase in DTA due to carry forward losses 
Window Mean CAR t-value p-value 
-1,+1 trading day 1.82% 2.87*** 0.0068 
-2,+2 trading days 2.16% 2.28** 0.0252 
-3,+3 trading days 2.98% 2.65*** 0.0097 
-4,+4 trading days 3.07% 2.68*** 0.0090 
-5,+5 trading days 2.95% 2.29** 0.0248 
-10,+10 trading days 2.57% 1.53 0.1312 
Panel B: Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns of 83 observations with no increase or decrease in DTA due to timing differences 
Window Mean CAR t-value p-value 
-1,+1 trading day 1.25% 1.40 0.1656 
-2,+2 trading days 1.06% 1.11 0.2704 
-3,+3 trading days 0.53% 0.45 0.6546 
-4,+4 trading days 1.26% 0.92 0.3586 
-5,+5 trading days 1.84% 1.33 0.1880 
-10,+10 trading days 2.34% 1.44 0.1524 
Panel C: Difference in mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns between observations with increase in DTA due to timing 
differences and observations with no change or decrease in DTA due to timing differences 
Window Difference in Mean CAR t-value p-value 
-1,+1 trading day 0.57% 0.52 0.6058 
-2,+2 trading days 1.11% 0.82 0.4113 
-3,+3 trading days 2.45% 1.50 0.1365 
-4,+4 trading days 1.81% 1.01 0.3133 
-5,+5 trading days 1.11% 0.59 0.5583 
-10,+10 trading days 0.23% 0.10 0.9213 
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Table 7 
Medium term market reaction 
BHARs for 154 sample firm observations over the period 1998 to 2008. The BHARs are generated using a control firm 
approach. In this table the control comprises firm years in which reported earnings meet/beat analysts' forecasts of both 
profit before tax and net profit after tax for -12 to -1 months before reporting date. Firms meeting/beating the forecasts 
are matched against the sample by the percentage that the firm meats/beats the forecasted net profit after tax. The 
BHAR for firm i is calculated by: 
 
where, Rit is the return on firm i in month t (t = -12, -11…, -1) and E(Rit) is the expected return of firm i in month t, 
given by that of a control firm. 
Panel A shows the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) and the t-statistics of sample firms that miss analysts' 
earnings before tax forecasts but meet the after tax forecasts using as control. Panel B shows the buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns (BHARs) for 1 to 12 months after the issue of the annual reports. The symbols *,** and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 1 Month 0 is the end of the event month, which is the 
month of release of the preliminary or final annual report to the market. Observations are winsorised at the top and 
bottom 2%. 
Panel A: BHARs using percentage meet/beat control firm (prior to event) 
Month1 Mean BHAR t-stat p-value 
-12 5.65% 1.38 0.1691 
-11 4.55% 1.22 0.2249 
-10 2.66% 0.76 0.4478 
-9 1.44% 0.43 0.6696 
-8 0.44% 0.14 0.8871 
-7 0.19% 0.07 0.9479 
-6 1.89% 0.69 0.4901 
-5 2.88% 1.19 0.2360 
-4 4.49% 1.92* 0.0571 
-3 4.37% 2.22** 0.0280 
-2 3.58% 2.25** 0.0257 
-1 2.03% 1.62 0.1072 
Panel B: BHARs using percentage meet/beat control firm (after event) 
Month1 Mean BHAR t-stat p-value 
1 -1.83% -1.66* 0.0982 
2 -3.81% -2.20** 0.0296 
3 -5.09% -2.12** 0.0359 
4 -5.82% -2.20** 0.0296 
5 -6.13% -1.95* 0.0534 
6 -7.00% -2.20** 0.0296 
7 -8.45% -2.31** 0.0220 
8 -9.43% -2.45** 0.0156 
9 -11.34% -2.74*** 0.0069 
10 -12.23% -2.72*** 0.0073 
11 -14.58% -3.07*** 0.0025 
12 -16.49% -3.30*** 0.0012 
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Table 8 
Medium-term market reaction for firms that recognize deferred tax assets from 
losses and timing differences 
Panel A shows the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) and the t-statistics of sample firms that miss analysts' earnings 
before tax forecasts but meet the after tax forecasts using as control. Panel B shows the buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
(BHARs) for 1 to 12 months after the issue of the annual reports. The symbols *,** and *** denote statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 1 Month 0 is the end of the event month, which is the month of release of the 
preliminary or final annual report to the market. Observations are winsorised at the top and bottom 2%. 
 
Panel A: BHARs for 38 sample firms that report an increase in deferred tax asset due to carry forward losses using 
percentage meet/beat control firm (increase in DTA due to carry forward losses) 
Month1 Mean BHAR t-stat p-value 
1 -0.82% -0.36 0.7189 
2 0.51% 0.12 0.9023 
3 -6.03% -1.67* 0.0991 
4 -6.18% -1.02 0.3136 
5 -8.16% -1.18 0.2452 
6 -6.52% -1.02 0.3167 
7 -6.62% -0.88 0.3847 
8 -10.77% -1.50 0.1420 
9 -13.16% -1.57 0.1249 
10 -14.38% -1.48 0.1473 
11 -12.95% -1.44 0.1583 
12 -14.38% -1.48 0.1473 
Panel B: BHARs for 74 sample firms that report an increase in deferred tax asset due to timing differences using 
percentage meet/beat control firm (increase in DTA due to carry forward losses) 
Month1 Mean BHAR t-stat p-value 
1 -2.70% -1.65 0.1027 
2 -4.30% -1.50 0.1384 
3 -7.54% -2.01** 0.0479 
4 -8.63% -1.99* 0.0507 
5 -8.66% -1.84* 0.0699 
6 -9.33% -1.98* 0.0522 
7 -10.25% -1.76 0.0818 
8 -9.86% -1.84* 0.0700 
9 -9.34% -1.40 0.1650 
10 -11.05% -1.49 0.1407 
11 -11.37% -1.53 0.1302 
12 -12.46% -1.68* 0.0977 
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